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Radical Islamic Terrorism in the Middle East and its Direct Costs on Western 
Financial Markets 
Martin Mullins and John Garvey 
 
 
Close examination of the behaviour of participants in financial markets in the 
aftermath of terrorist attacks is a valuable line of enquiry. In this paper, we bring 
together insights from field of finance and politics. Specifically, we examine trading 
patterns on highly liquid insurance-type financial instruments around a specific 
terrorist event. This approach provides an insight into risk perception around political 
violence and allows us to answer a number of key questions on the impact of terrorist 
attacks on economies and societies. When examined and processed, intraday financial 
trade data yields valuable empirical evidence on immediate reactions to the threat 
posed by terrorist groups. The methodology applied in this paper also tells us much 
about the geographical resonance of terrorist events. We clearly show that fear of 
economic disruption can be activated in Western markets by events that are often 
geographically remote. Importantly, these datasets allow us to judge the vulnerability 
of financial markets to terrorist attack. This potentially allows public authorities to 
safeguard our interests more effectively. Financial markets are one important element 
of a “neglected home front” and the risks posed by disruption to those markets are 
such as to merit our urgent attention.
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The Markets: 9/11 and its Aftermath  
 
In their analysis of the economic impact of terrorism, Lenain, Bonturi and Koen 
(2002), argue that the financial markets recovered relatively quickly after the WTC 
attacks. By the end of 2001 equity prices had largely bounced back to levels seen on 
September 10
th  of that year. Similarly, other financial indicators associated with 
increased volatility in financial market such as interest rates spreads returned to those 
levels seen before the attack. They conclude by stating, “on the whole, the shock to 
the financial markets thus seems to have been largely transitory.”
2 Thus, the long term 
resonance of the September 11
th attacks in both the social and political arena does not 
appear to be reflected in the behaviour of Western market participants. In this paper 
we show that contrary to the evidence provided by stock market levels, security fears 
persisted long after the events of September 11th and these fears were amplified by 
terrorist activities located in the Middle East. 
 
The psychological impact of the September 11th attack was clearly reflected in asset 
price volatility during the period immediately following the attack. The `flight to 
safety' which occurred saw a significant movement of assets from the risky end of the 
investment spectrum (the stock market) towards safer investment vehicles such as 
cash and the bond market. This observation however must be placed in the context of 
a general stock market decline that had begun the previous year. The well-
documented TMT (telecom, media and technology) stock market bubble had 
developed over the latter part of the previous decade and the awareness of unjustified 
asset prices had led to a shift in investor sentiment so that by March 2000 investors 
were reducing their holdings in these companies. The FTSE100 Index was not 
immune from this unwinding since the stock values of some of its top ranked member 
companies, such as Vodafone, suffered severe declines. Stock market prices are often 
underpinned by sentiment and this phenomena is vulnerable and subject to rapid 2 
 
change. Political violence represents a threat to confidence and to the stability of 
financial markets. 
 
   
Financial Markets as a Target  
 
Financial markets are of crucial importance to the functioning of Western society. For 
those seeking to disrupt the operation of wider society, economic targets have long 
been part of the overall strategy.
3 The repeated ETA (Euskadi Ta Askatasuna) attacks 
on Spain’s tourist infrastructure in the early 1990s is an example of such a tactic. 
Historically, terrorist groups (non state military actors) have sought to exert leverage 
through putting pressure on actors in the economic/financial sphere. The logic is that 
by imposing a high cost on particular parts of a society that this would weaken the 
resolve of the State in resisting demands of such groups. Radical Islamic groups 
understand that if they impose sufficient pressure, they may force policy changes on 
the part of Western governments. 
 
There is much debate over the motivation for Al Qaeda’s actions. Abrams (2006) 
outlines the four most common sets of interpretations; 1. Al Qaeda hates freedom and 
seeks to impose its view of the word. 2. The desire to kill Americans is seen as end in 
itself. 3. Al Qaeda wish to provoke the US into a waging wars in the Middle East. 4. 
Al Qaeda wants to change US foreign policy, particularly as it pertains to the Middle 
East.
4 The fact that there is no consensus on their ultimate goals and a high degree of 
uncertainty about their capabilities ensures that financial markets are even more 
vulnerable as a target for such groups. It is this feature, namely the difficulty in 
assigning clear goals to this movement, which makes Al Qaeda so threatening to 
financial markets. In the financial literature, experimental research has demonstrated 
the reluctance of individuals to engage in investment in the presence of ambiguity. In 
this instance, ambiguity can be defined as a state where there are a number of 
potential outcomes and each of these outcomes cannot be assigned a probability. 
Market participants will always prefer to invest in an environment where they feel 
they can assign a numerical probability of future outcomes occurring.
5 Empirical 
studies that have demonstrated greater market engagement following company 
announcements thus demonstrating a preference in markets for information flows that 
conform to a well understood system.
 6 
 
The development of terrorist groups such as Al Qaeda who are active across borders 
and regions represents a new dynamic for those in the financial markets. Mullins and 
Garvey (2008) refer to Al Qaeda as de-territorialized, such groups are potentially 
more dangerous and certainly more unpredictable than State sponsored groups and 
those organisations with a geographic base.
7 For terrorist groups with a geographical 
base, it is important for them to retain support in their communities and this limits the 
military options available to them. Targets are often presented as being legitimate 
targets and can be restricted to political/military targets. The imperative not to damage 
their support base ensures their actions are more predictable. “New” terrorist actors 
are not constrained in this way and they are less beholden to a specific constituency, 
hence often no real distinction is made between civilian and military targets. As the 
operational capacity of such groups improves, the political/security environment may 
deteriorate very quickly. Financial markets have had to deal with terrorism in the past. 
In the UK the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) directly targeted the financial 3 
 
community in London.
8 However in this instance the terrorist group was perceived to 
operating in a well understood system, controlled by a politically aware Army 
Council with well discipline operatives.
9 Al Qaeda is different in that the goals of the 
organisation is not well understood, nor indeed is the nature of the organisation itself. 
Moreover, there is no clear understanding of the upper limit of violence this group in 
capable of. This creates a dread factor not only for the population in general but also 





Al Qaeda is not well understood by its enemies and indeed Al Qaeda, in its 
communiqués, bemoans that fact.
11 That Al Qaeda is not well understood does not 
mean that there is an absence of rationality in the organisation. There is an acceptance 
that the in terms of targeting there is rationality at work.
12 Given the pressure on its 
resources Al Qaeda needs to manage it target selection with some care. Improved 
security has seen them turn towards softer targets. Bergen (2005) states, “they now 
care about economic targets because they understand that this is the best way, in a 
sense, to attack the West.”
13 In a audio tape released in 2004 Bin Laden stated that Al 
Qaeda were committed "to continuing this policy in bleeding American to the point of 
bankruptcy." He went on to say that whilst the September 11 attacks had cost his 




A striking aspect of the coverage of the World Trade Centre attack was the 
subsequent attention that focused on the financial markets. Similarly, many of those 
commenting in the aftermath of the July 2005 bombings in London stressed the 
resilience of markets in the face of the attacks.
15 There is often an explicit, sometimes 
implicit acceptance that the markets are an important element of this “war”. In 
security terms the behaviour of the markets are crucial. Jihadi terrorist networks may 
not be able to mount sustained campaigns but the responsiveness of the markets still 
means that they can impose a heavy cost on the West. In effect, financial markets 
provide substantial leverage to these networks. 
 
High levels of liquidity and the role of information and the media mean that these 
markets are extremely responsive to events. Financial markets are both strategically 
vital and vulnerable to precisely what Al Qaeda is able to produce, fear and negative 
emotion. In societies that pride themselves on their rationality financial markets, 
paradoxically, are both vital and prone to emotionality. Institutions such as stock 
markets render visible the co-existence of the modern and the pre-modern in our 
society. In other public institutions irrationality and emotionality have tended to be 
excluded from the mainstream of the discourse. In financial markets, there is an 
acceptance of the saliency of emotional factors in the markets.
16 It is this combination 
of strategic importance and vulnerability that makes the relationship between 
terrorism and financial markets such a fascinating area of study. Technology enabled 
velocity and the global nature of these markets allows fear and panic to spread with 
extreme rapidity. The phenomenon of 24-hour news coverage means that events are 




Another important aspect of the markets is that their sheer size precludes government 
from exercising any more than a degree of influence. Taking the example of the forex 
markets, the average daily trade in 2007 stood at around US$3.2 trillion.
17 The 
phenomenon of financialization has raised the stakes in that financial markets have 
become progressively more central to our economic security. The combination of 
strategic importance and vulnerability ensures that understanding the response of 
financial markets to terrorism is vital to protecting States around the world. There is 
often an explicit, sometime implicit acceptance that the markets are an important 
element of this “war”.
18 In security terms, the behaviour of the markets are crucial. 
Jihadi terrorist networks may not be mount sustained campaigns but the 




Market Responses to Political Violence  
 
The impact of violent conflict on the economy has long been a subject of debate. 
Discussion has often focused on increased production related to war and to the 
negative consequences of trade dislocation. More recently Schneider and Troeger 
(2006) point to the indifferent or positive market reactions to the recent wars.
19 Using 
the example of the first Gulf War, the conflict over Kosovo and the 2003 invasion of 
Iraq, they show some examples of increased stock market volatility but demonstrate 
that for the most part markets reacted fairly positively to these events. One feature of 
these violent conflicts is their asymmetrical nature. In general terms, there was little 
doubt about the likely winner in these inter-state conflicts. Terrorism too has its roots 
in power asymmetries but the consequences of this type of conflict are perceived as 
less predictable. This is in part due to an essential characteristic of terrorism, namely 
it is an attempt to strike at the psyche of the target population. The reaction of the host 
population to terrorism is difficult to predict. The multitude of studies in the aftermath 
of the WTC attacks point to the various and varied impacts on the US population.
20 
The impact of terrorist attacks is not temporally bounded and their impact may linger 
and continue cause economic loss for some time after the initial event. It may not be 
easy to detect the continuing fear and unease in the markets. One of the main insights 
offered by this paper is that it is insufficient to review asset prices or indices of assets 
prices to detect the continuing impact of a large scale terrorist incidents. In order to 
gauge the behaviour of market participants in response to these incidents other more 
sensitive (forward looking) financial instrument need to be included in any analy.sis. 
Terrorism does create fear and uncertainty, this is clearly visible in the options 
markets 
 
More generally, terrorism has tangible affects on the world’s economy. Terrorism can 
also be seen to have particular impacts on national economies. These impacts are not 
principally related to the damage caused, though this can be severe.
21 The negative 
effects of terrorism are often related to secondary actions. The response of the State to 
attacks can cause severe economic disruption. That is to say that the reaction of public 
authorities can extremely costly. In the aftermath of the WTC attacks increased 
security resulted in tangible economic consequence. There is the displacement of 
resources to consider. In GDP terms, an increase in public military spending by 1 per 
cent and a 0.5 per cent rise in private security spending may result in a reduction in 
output of 0.7 per cent.
22 The attacks produced a number of effects in business 5 
 
geography, architecture of buildings and cross border trading patterns.
23 In certain 
sectors the impact was very serious indeed, in particular the airline industry and 
tourism. In the case of the latter, increased security may have caused a substantial 
drop in visitor numbers to the US. The ability of terrorist actors to damage the tourist 
industry in well documented and the experience of certain European countries and the 
Levant region is instructive in this regard.
24  
 
It is not plausible that an event of the magnitude of 9/11 did not have an effect on the 
mentality of those engaged in the financial markets.
25 We show in this paper that 
unease and nervousness remained in the markets years after this event. It adds 
evidentiary weight to arguments put forward by Slovic that we had entered a new era 
of political violence.
26 Events as spectacular as the WTC attacks inevitably have an 
effect on the worldview of human subjects In the social sciences and philosophy there 
is a general consensus that actors in the social realm (here the focus is one financial 
traders) are not merely rational actors operating in the present. They are influenced by 
the past, a sense of belonging and by the other human actors.
27 The actions of human 
subjects are always influenced by the position they occupy, this is true both in 
historical and societal terms.
28 The financial literature has identified characteristics of 
market participants that do not fit neatly with traditional theories on rationality. In 
particular, early studies in behavioural finance demonstrated that individuals very 
often behave in an irrational and emotional manner
29. These so-called biases in human 





Terrorism: Impacts on Financial Market 
 
Chen and Siems (2004) interpreting terrorism in its broadest possible context use an 
event-study methodology to measure the impact of a number of events since 1915. 
The authors note that in the case of a low-probability, high consequence events 
investors will shift their investment policy into defensive assets.
30 Eldor and Melnick 
(2004) examined the impact of terrorism on Israeli financial markets finding that 
suicide bombing had a tangible and long-lasting effect on the Israeli stock market.
31  
Maillet and Michel (2005) also examine the impact of terrorist events on stock 
markets. They look specifically at market reaction to the WTC attack. Using a 
particular measure of volatility they found that the WTC attack had significant 
repercussions in both the US and French stock markets.
32  
 
The attacks of September 11
th 2001 had a profound impact on capital markets 
globally. The immediate aftermath saw sharp falls in equity prices, however financial 
markets were quick to recover and many of the indicators of perceived risk returned to 
normal by the first quarter of 2002.
33  
  
Table 1. S&P 500 - Stock price recoveries 
  Reaction period Reaction  One year later* 
Pearl Harbor  7 to 29 Dec. 1941  -10.2  15.3 
Korean War  23 June to 17 July 1950  -12.9  31.4 
Cuban missile crisis  23 Aug to 26 Oct 1961  -8.8  36.6 
Tet offensive, Vietnam War  31 Jan. To 5 Mar. 1968  -5.6  13.7 
Iraqi invasion of Kuwait  2 Aug 1990 to 16 Jan. 1991  -11.1  32.3 6 
 
11 September, 2001  11 to 19 Sept. 2001  -7.0  15.0 
a)  Six months later in the case of the September 11 attacks 
b)  The reaction period is defined as ending when the US military build-up starts. 
Sources: Bank of England, Financial Stability Review, December 2001 and OECD 
 
During times of increased flows of information on geopolitical/terrorist risk it is not 
unreasonable to conclude that there should be evidence of increased asset volatility. 
The causal relationship described here forms the basis for previous studies that have 
linked terrorist risk to financial markets. In the three year period following September 
11, 2001, stock prices were relatively resilient in the face of non-catastrophic terrorist 
attacks. As one would expect, certain sectors were more responsive to terrorist events 
than others but overall market indices demonstrated a high degree of resilience. In the 
case of the FTSE index events such as the Bali bombing of 2002 are scarcely 
perceptible. This is explained by the fact that a number of other variables feed into the 
pricing of the assets contained within this index and so the effect of a terrorist incident 
may be drowned out by other data. The stability of asset prices may mask elevated 
level of fear in the market as transaction costs and the ability to hedge exposure mean 
that investor may choose to hold on vulnerable stock in the knowledge any losses will 
be limited.   
 
 
Options Market, Index Options as a Terrorist Risk Indicator 
 
In this paper a dynamic proxy for levels of security fear is provided by trading 
patterns in widely used financial instruments, known as put options. These contracts 
give the holder a financial payoff dependent on the value of some underlying asset. 
The structure of these contracts means that they are used by market practitioners to 
protect against or speculate on future asset price movements. Options market 
dynamics provide an insight into investor sentiment since option contract valuation is 
essentially forward-looking and reflects expectations of future asset price volatility.  
The focus of our study is on FTSE-100 Index Put Options whose traded price is 
dependent on the value of equity indices such as the FTSE-100.  
 
We proceed by briefly explaining the structure of a FTSE-100 Index Put Option 
through an example. For a fund manager who invests broadly in large UK firms that 
are members of the FTSE-100 index. (JG) Index put options can be used to protect 
against downward movement in the value of those stocks.  As an illustration, let us 
say the FTSE-100 is trading at 4,000 and a 3-month put option is available with a 
strike price (X) of 3,800. If the value of the Index is trading at 3,500 by the end of the 
contract period, then the payoff for the put option is 300 (3,800 - 3,500). In general an 
economic value (£100) is associated with each point in the index, thus providing a 
payoff of £30,000 (300 points x £100) for each contract held. The payoff structure of 
holding a put option contract is shown in Figure 1a. (john can we start this with an 





These instruments are widely applied as part of a strategy to protect the value of an 
equity portfolio from declining below a certain level. For a fund manager who has a 
current exposure to the stock market, purchasing put option contracts allows him or 
her to establish a floor portfolio value. The intrinsic value of index put option 
increases as the value of the index falls below the strike price (X). Applied effectively 
this almost exactly offsets the decline in the underlying asset, in this case, the equity 
index. The payoff structure of this strategy is illustrated in Figure 1b below. 
     
 
 
The cost associated with this strategy is the premium paid for each put option 
purchased. In an environment where negative expectations dominate these 
instruments become more expensive, thus increasing the cost of protection. 
 
 
Empirical Evidence of Security Fear 
 
In our paper we examine the trading pattern of out of the money (OTM) index put 
options
34. Increased demand for this type of option provides an insight into the level 
of security fear being experienced by market participants. By looking at the London 
options market during specific Middle East terrorist events we can evaluate the 
X
Figure 1b Hedged Portfolio Payoff (Asset + Put Option) 






Figure 1a Put Option Payoff 








resonance of terrorist activities outside of the region in which they occur in a post 
September 11th environment.  
 
This paper records the financial market reaction to a specific ‘non-catastrophic’ 
terrorist event. The bombing of the UN Headquarters in Baghdad on the 20th August 
2003 occurred shortly after the fall of the Iraq government led by Saddam Hussein. 
From the perspective of market participants the event is both geographically remote 
and does not directly damage the financial infrastructure or the property of any 
member corporation of the FTSE-100 Index.  Its impact on uncertainty and the 
heightened perception of political and/or terrorist risk is reflected in the trading 
patterns in the options market. Figure 2 shows the activity in out-of-the-money index 
options around the time of the Baghdad bombing. The volumes traded in these 
instruments are shown for the month prior to and the month following the attack. In 
each case 22 trading days are assumed. It can be seen from figure 2 below that traded 
volumes of these instruments spike on the day of the attack and the day following the 
attack. In fact the volumes hit a two-month peak on the day following the attack.  
 
Figure 3 maps the level of the FTSE-100 Index for the 22 days prior to and post the 
bombing of the UN Headquarters.  
 
 
The market in the underlying stock market does not exhibit the same sensitivity to this 
event.  In fact the values of FTSE-100 companies remained relatively unaffected. The 
gradual increase in stock values up to the 20
th August 2003 continued in the month 
following the attack. An explanation is thus required to reconcile the apparently 
different indications of certainty and fear that are provided by the options and the 
stock market respectively.   
 9 
 
Given what we know about the function of OTM Index put options as hedging 
instruments, the gap between the option and underlying markets demonstrates that 
market participants interpreted this event as having a direct effect on the volatility of a 
broad based Western stock market. However, recognition of the importance of the 
event was coupled with an uncertainty regarding the political implications of the act. 
The sense of uncertainty meant that they were unwilling to immediately shift their 
resources from the relatively risky stock market. An asset allocation decision to move 
out of equities and into bonds or cash would impose direct financial costs in the form 
of transaction costs. It would also impose an indirect financial cost since fund 
managers may potentially lose out on a gain in stock value. Index options accurately 
capture the nervous uncertainty of the bombing of the UN headquarters in Baghdad. 
Traders recognised the potential internationalization of the conflict through a direct 
attack on this institution however the timing of future effects remain unclear and 
vague.  Index Put Options allow them to protect their investments against large future 
falls, whilst maintaining an exposure to risky assets. In an environment where there 
are persistent fears and uncertainty index options provide us with the ideal gauge of 
how terrorist and political events affect the populace. The attack on the UN 
headquarter in Baghdad is not the only attack that registered clearly in the index 
options market. In the aftermath of the World Trade Centre attacks index option 





Discussion on Security Implications  
 
The open and dynamic characteristics of the financial markets allows terrorists groups 
such as Al Qaeda to leverage their attacks. There is a long history of terrorist groups 
using economic impact to gain such leverage. Both the PIRA and ETA used relatively 
discreet and limited actions in order to damage tourist interest and cause million of 
pounds/euros worth of damage for a relatively small investment on their part. Enders 
and Sandler (1991), using  monthly data a VAR methodology, estimate that each 
incident cost the Spanish economy 140,000 tourists.
35 Given the pressure exerted on 
their resources by security agencies terrorist groups need to maximise the impact of 
their attacks. Financial markets offer an effective mechanism to gain maximum 
impact from attacks. The reaction of markets to attacks can in effect multiply the 
effect. This situation has been shown to be particularly acute in the aviation/tourist 
sector.
36 Terrorist incidents can damage infrastructure and have a tangible effect on 
future income streams, but the impact on share prices in the sector is also very 
significant. The ability to cause fear and uncertainty in populations means that 
financial markets represent ideal targets. Financial market participants are exposed to 
news coverage and any risk amplification effect feeds uncertainty in the financial 
markets. Liquidity means that traders are able to quickly offload those stocks 
perceived to be at higher risk due to terrorist actions and certain sectors may be badly 
effected as a result. Drakos (2004) show the impact on the share prices on airlines 
lasted well into the following year.
37 Whilst then the general stock markets may have 
bounced back relatively quickly, there was lasting damage in certain sectors. Through 
their actions Al Qaeda has severely directly effected one of the North America most 
important industries and one that has a critical role to play in terms of transport 
infrastructure. The ability of a terrorist attack, albeit in this instance a catastrophic 10 
 
event, to badly damage a key part of economic life is clear. Moreover what is also 
evident is the important role that the financial markets played in damaging the US 
airline industry. This is crucial and demonstrates the leverage effect of financial 
markets in the aftermath of terrorist attacks. 
 
In the case of the overall index the impact of 9/11 is less striking and, as has been 
said, indices did recover fairly quickly. However, our analysis of the markets in index 
put options reveal that the continued ability of Al Qaeda to cause fear and uncertainly 
in Western markets. The purchase index put options indicate the fear of a general and 
sharp downward movement in stock market. The fact that a bomb attack in Bagdad 
resonated through the London options market show the sensitivity of the financial 
markets to these attacks. Spikes in OTM volumes show a continued state of anxiety 
among in market participants and a willingness to bear the considerable cost 
associated with the purchase of put options. The availability of hedging mechanisms 
such as index put options make underlying asset prices more stable in the face of 
terrorist attacks. This said, it worth noting that such options are costly (and would 
become much more so if we saw a series of successful attacks) and in the longer term 
there is the question of just how sustainable such investment strategies are.   
 
 
Some Conclusions  
 
In order to be successful, terrorists need to impose high cost on states and secure an 
audience for their actions. Financial markets offer an effective conduit to achieve 
these goals. The media feeds news of terrorist events to the markets and then go on to 
inform the general population on the reaction of those markets. In conjunction with 
the media, the nature of financial markets mean that Al Qaeda is able to affect the 
lives of and the sense of security millions of citizens in the North America and 
Europe. Citizens depend on the financial markets for their savings and pension. 
Furthermore, adverse movement in these markets can impact upon their job security. 
Much of the fear after the 9/11 attacks related to physical security, however, Al Qaeda 
has an ability to cause very pernicious and damaging forms of insecurity. In terms of 
the financial markets, some of the weaknesses of Al Qaeda do in fact constitute 
strengths. The lack of a disciplined organisation, the absence of a single geographical 
base and an unclear set of objectives all combine to produce a phenomenon that 
deeply troubles financial markets, namely uncertainty. For those engaged in 
protecting Western citizens from the terrorist groups the financial markets represent a 
serious challenge. Their global nature, size and dynamism put them largely beyond 
the control of the State and herein lies the opportunity for Al Qaeda and other radical 
terrorist groups. Our work on the options market should alert regulators and those 
charged with anti terrorist policy that the combination modern global financial 
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